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Abstract
One of the major characteristics of the capital budgeting process is
the delay existing between the investment decision and its implementa-
tion. This paper analyses investment decisions under uncertainty with
implementation delay in a unified analytical framework. We provide
closed-form solutions relating the value of the investment opportunity
and the optimal investment threshold to the size of the delay. We
show that the implementation lag creates an embedded option for the
investor: the option to abandon the project during this delay. We de-
rive the value of this option for various exercise policies corresponding
to diﬀerent levels of freedom with respect to the abandonment of the
project and analyse its eﬀects on the investment policy of the firm.
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Since the early 80’s, advances in the real options literature have com-
pletely changed the way we evaluate investment opportunities. However, in
spite of large theoretical advances, little research has focused on the prac-
tical side of the investment spending. One of the major characteristics of
the capital budgeting process is the delay existing between the investment
decision and its implementation. This implementation lag is generally as-
sociated with the construction period, the decision process within the firm
or the gathering of the financing funds necessary to undertake the capital
expenditure. Empirical studies by Ross (1986) and Taggart (1987) docu-
ment for example that projects are generally initiated from the bottom up,
suggesting a centralization of the capital allocation process. Depending on
the nature and the size of the investment spending, projects that have been
approved at the division level may have to be submitted to headquarters.
Although all these intermediary steps may have important valuation conse-
quences, they have generally been ignored in the real options literature1.
This paper analyses in a unifying framework the valuation eﬀects of in-
vestment lags2. We derive closed-form formulas relating the value of the
investment opportunity and the optimal investment policy to the size of
the delay. We find that the implementation delay has a large negative im-
pact on the value of the investment opportunity when the commitment to
invest is irreversible. We then compute the value of the project when the
firm has an abandonment option allowing it to unwind the investment de-
cision during or after the implementation period, depending on the ongoing
profitability of the investment project. From the simulations, we draw two
main conclusions. First, European abandonment options, i.e. profitability
requirements applying at the implementation date, do not increase the wel-
fare of investors when the investment decision is made optimally. Second,
”American” abandonment options, i.e. profitability requirements applying
to the whole implementation period, partly oﬀset the value loss associated
with implementation lags.
In the following section, we build a framework allowing the valuation
of investment projects when there is an implementation lag. Section two
derives the value of investment projects for various investment policies. Sec-
1Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) extend Dixit’s (1989) analysis to incorporate investment
lags in a real options model. However they do not analyse the valuation eﬀects of invest-
ment lags.
2Our analysis significantly diﬀers from the sequential investment literature where the
firm is not committed to complete the project. In this literature each dollar invested in the
investment opportunity gives the firm the option to spend another dollar in the project.
See for example Majd and Pindyck (1987) or Pindyck (1993).
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tion three concludes the paper and presents possible extensions. Technical
developments are gathered in the appendix.
1 A general model of investment decisions with
implementation delay
This section develops the valuation framework. In order to emphasize the ef-
fect of lags on investment decisions, we consider the simplest possible setting.
As a result, the model relies on the following assumption. (A1) Markets are
perfect with no transaction costs. (A2) There exists a constant riskfree rate
r at which investors may lend and borrow freely. (A3) The firm has an ex-
clusive access to a project producing output forever3. The constant capital
expenditure is denoted by C, production costs are zero and the production
rate is one unit of output per unit of time. (A4) There exists a portfolio of
traded assets that pays dividends at the constant rate δ and the return of
which is perfectly correlated with the output price. (A5) Under the unique
risk neutral probability measure Q, the dynamics of the output price (St)t≥0
are given by
dSt
St
= (r − δ)dt+ σdWt (1)
where σ is a constant parameter and (Wt)t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion
on the probability space (Ω,F , Q). In equation (1), δ can be interpreted as
a constant convenience yield.
The Markovian features of the model and the stationarity of the distri-
bution of the payoﬀs generated by the active project imply that the invest-
ment decision occurs at the first instant when the decision variable (St)t≥0
hits some constant upper optimal barrier h∗. One common characteristic
of traditional real options models4 is the implicit assumption that actions
are taken instantaneously: The project starts producing output as soon as
the investor has decided to invest. Therefore, the flow of profits accrues to
investors at the stopping time Th∗ (S) defined by
Th∗ (S) = inf {t ≥ 0, St = h∗}
In this paper, we evaluate investment projects when there is a delay
between the investment decision and its implementation. As mentioned
3Standard justifications of the assumption of irreversibility rely on the lemons problem
or capital specificity of the assets in place (see for example Abel and alii (1996)). The
irreversibility assumption is very realistic for economic activities which are highly capital
intensive such as mining projects or oﬀshore petroleum leases.
4See for example Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a review.
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earlier, this implementation delay can be due to the research of an investment
opportunity on an emerging market, to the capital budgeting process within
the firm, to the construction lag or to the time spent gathering the financing
funds. When we take the implementation lag into account, the project
starts producing output at a stopping time Th∗ (S) + θ (S) where θ (S) is
a parametrized time independent of Th∗ (S) and such that the level of the
decision variable at time Th∗ (S)+θ (S) is independent of θ (S) and Th∗ (S).
This added time can be viewed as a general constraint. It can be a fixed time
or any time that conditions the implementation of the investment spending.
Suppose that the firm invests at an arbitrary investment boundary h.
The value of the investment project for S0 < h is given by
V (h,∆, C, θ) = EQS0
"Z ∞
Th(S)+θ(S)
dte−rtSt
#
−CEQS0
h
e−r(Th(S)+θ(S))
i
(2)
In equation (2), the first term of the RHS is the expected present value of
the profits generated by the project whereas the second term represent the
expected present value of the capital expenditure. Using standard results of
Brownian motion calculus, we obtain after simplifications
V (h,∆, C, θ) =
µ
S0
h
¶ξ
EQh
h
e−rθ(S)
iµ
∆hEQh
·
Sθ(S)
h
¸
−C
¶
(3)
where ∆ = δ−1 and ξ = 12 −
r−δ
σ2 +
q
2r
σ2 +
¡
1
2 −
r−δ
σ2
¢2
.
Let us denote A (θ) = EQh
£
e−rθ(S)
¤
and B (θ) = EQh
£
Sθ(S)/h
¤
. A (θ) is
the discounting factor associated with the implementation delay while B (θ)
accounts for the change in the expected operating profit due to the path of
the decision variable during this period. Using equation (3), we can write
V (h,∆, C, θ) = V (h,∆A (θ)B (θ) , CA (θ) , 0) (4)
The value of the investment opportunity, for a given investment barrier h,
can be expressed as the value of the investment opportunity with no delay
and modified parameters. Straightforward calculations give us the optimal
barrier and the optimal value of the investment opportunity.
Proposition 1 When there is an implementation delay, the value of the
investment opportunity and the optimal investment threshold are respectively
given by
V (h∗,∆, C, θ) = A (θ)
µ
∆B (θ)S0
ξ
¶ξ µ C
ξ − 1
¶1−ξ
(5)
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and
h∗ (∆, C, θ) =
ξ
ξ − 1
C
∆B (θ)
(6)
The following section shows that the implementation delay reduces the
value of investment opportunities and provides alternative investment rules
aimed at minimizing the associated value reduction.
2 Implementation delay and embedded options
2.1 Implementation delay with no exit option
Let us consider first the case where the delay is a fixed time d and the firm
invests at time Th (S) + d whatever the evolution of the decision variable
during the time interval [Th (S) , Th (S) + d]. This simple case gives us the
value reduction associated with the implementation lag when there is no
abandonment option i.e. when the commitment to invest is irreversible.
Straightforward calculations yield
A (θ) = e−rd, B (θ) = e(r−δ)d and h∗ (∆, C, d) = e−(r−δ)dh∗ (∆, C, 0)
When there is an implementation delay, investors anticipate the investment
decision if they anticipate a positive growth of the state variable or postpone
it otherwise.
Using equation (5), we see that the ratio of the value of the investment
opportunity with delay to that with no delay is
r (θ) = exp {(ξ (r − δ)− r)d} < 1
Figure 1 below plots r (θ) as a function d and δ for d ∈ [0, 2], δ ∈
[0, 0.065], r = 0.07 and σ = 0.2. It reveals that the implementation lag
has a significant impact on the value of the project. The associated value
reduction is due to the discounting of the investment NPV from Th + d to
Th and to the dependence of the value of the project on the evolution of the
decision variable during the implementation period5. Also, observe that the
value reduction due to the implementation delay is highly sensitive to the
5The average change in the decision variable during the implementation delay is given
by exp ((r − δ) d) which is larger than one for r > δ. However, abandonment options are
not valueless since the real path followed by the decision variable can be unfavorable to
the firm.
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value of the convenience yield: As the opportunity cost of remaining inactive
increases, the value loss due to the implementation delay gets larger.
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2.2 European abandonment option
We consider in this section that the firm has a European abandonment op-
tion allowing it to unwind the investment decision at the end of the imple-
mentation lag. The investment decision is still triggered when the decision
variable reaches some constant upper barrier h. However, it is implemented
only if the state variable is above a new cutoﬀ level h0 at the end of the
implementation lag.
Consider for example, a decision taken at division level that has to be ap-
proved by the headquarters. If the approval arrives d units of time after the
submittance, then the operational manager invests only if the state variable
is above a new cutoﬀ level h0. The headquarters have no own profitability
requirements during the implementation lag and the approval is based on
the strategical merits of the project (new line of business, expanded mar-
kets). By contrast, the operational manager has profitability requirements
each time he is in charge with the decision i.e. at the initiation of the project
and at the end of the implementation period.
In this new setting, the project starts producing output at the first time
when d units of time after having hit h, the state variable is above h0.
This stopping time is mathematically described in the appendix. Using
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proposition 3 from the appendix, we get
A (θ) = e−rd
1−N
µ
b
√
d+ ln (h0/h)
³
σ
√
d
´−1¶
1−N
µ
−
p
(2r + b2)d+ ln (h0/h)
³
σ
√
d
´−1¶ (7)
B (θ) = e(r−δ)d
1−N
µ
(b+ σ)
√
d+ ln (h0/h)
³
σ
√
d
´−1¶
1−N
µ
−b
√
d+ ln (h0/h)
³
σ
√
d
´−1¶ . (8)
where b =
¡
r − δ − σ2/2
¢
/σ and N is the Standard Normal cumulative
distribution function
N (x) = 1√
2π
Z x
−∞
e−
t2
2 dt, x ∈ R
Figure 2 below plots the ratio of the value of the investment opportu-
nity with the European abandonment option to that with no abandonment
option.
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The European abandonment option will never be exercised as we have
h0/h = 0 at the optimum. When the manager holds a European abandon-
ment option, the value of waiting to invest at the maturity of this security
(i.e. at the implementation date) is lower than the benefits of investing
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directly. Postponing the investment spending at the end of the implemen-
tation period reduces the value of the project by a larger amount than an
immediate exercise does.
Let us consider for example the simple special case where h0 = h. Then
we have from equations (7) and (8)
A (θ) = e−rd
1−N(b
√
d)
1−N
³
−
√
(2r+b2)d
´ and B (θ) = e(r−δ)d 1−N((b+σ)√d)
1−N(−b
√
d)
The ratio of the value of the investment opportunity with the European
abandonment option to that with no abandonment option satisfies
r (θ) =
1−N
³
b
√
d
´
1−N
³
−
p
(2r + b2) d
´


1−N
³
(b+ σ)
√
d
´
1−N
³
−b
√
d
´


ξ
which is lower than 1.
2.3 The Parisian abandonment option
This section provides the value of the project when the manager invests
at the end of the implementation delay only the decision variable remains
above the investment threshold during this whole period. This investment
criterion reflects the willingness of the firm to check that market conditions
remain favorable during the implementation lag.
In order to find the value of the investment opportunity under this so-
called investment Parisian6 policy, we define the following random variables,
all linked to a random process S:
ght (S) = sup {s ≤ t : Ss = h}
τhd (S) = inf
n
t ≥ 0 :
³
t− ght (S)
´
≥ d, St ≥ h
o
.
ght (S) represents the last time before t the process S crossed the level h.
τhd (S) is therefore the first instant when the process has spent d units of
time consecutively over the level h.
Using section 2 of the appendix, we get
A (θ) =
Φ(b
√
d)³
Φ
³√
d(2r+b2)
´´ and B (θ) = Φ((σ+b)√d)
(Φ(b
√
d))
6 See Chesney, Jeanblanc and Yor (1997) for a definition of Parisian options.
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where
Φ (x) = 1 +
√
2πx exp
¡
x2/2
¢N (x) .
The ratio of the value of the project when the manager holds a Parisian
option to that of the standard case with an implementation delay is
r (θ) =
ed[r−ξ(r−δ)]Φ
³
b
√
d
´
Φ
³p
d (2r + b2)
´


∆Φ
³
(σ + b)
√
d
´
ξΦ
³
b
√
d
´


ξ
Figure 3 below plots r (θ) as a function d and δ for d ∈ [0, 2], δ ∈
[0, 0.065], r = 0.07 and σ = 0.2. The value of the investment opportunity
is higher when the investor has the opportunity to choose the Parisian in-
vestment criterion. This is particularly true when the opportunity cost of
remaining inactive (represented by δ) is large.
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When the investing firm holds a Parisian abandonment option, the op-
timal investment boundary is given by
h (∆, Ce, d) = h (∆, Ce, 0)
Φ
³
b
√
d
´
Φ
³
(σ + b)
√
d
´
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Since Φ (.) is a strictly increasing function, the investment boundary is lower
than in the standard case with no implementation delay. Moreover, the
larger the implementation lag, the lower the optimal investment barrier is
and, thus, the lower the hurdle rate used by the firm.
The Parisian investment policy provides the value of the decision variable
under which there will be no investment. There is a value of waiting to
invest but the value of the state variable at the investment date and the
option premium can vary according to the basic parameters and the shape
of the excursion of the decision variable above the barrier. The value of the
decision variable for which investment will occur and the value of the option
premium can therefore be over or under the standard ones.
2.4 Exponential abandonment policy
Standard results concerning American options show that the optimal exer-
cise barrier exhibits some time dependence. Therefore, the Parisian criterion
is not absolutely optimal since the abandonment barrier is constant.
In this section, we give the value of the investment opportunity when the
manager invests only if the decision variable remains during the implementa-
tion delay above a time dependent early abandonment boundary. Following
Omberg (1987) and Ju (1998), we approximate the early exercise boundary
of the American abandonment option by an exponential function which is
given the following form g (t) = he−σ(ε+βt) where ² and β are positive real
numbers. ² > 0 implies that there is an initial jump in the abandonment
barrier while β takes into account the time dependence of this boundary.
According to this specification, the firm takes into account the cost of post-
poning once again the investment spending and has a decreasing minimum
profitability requirement during the whole implementation lag.
Proposition 5 gives the value of the coeﬃcients A (θ) and B (θ) when the
manager follows this exponential exercise policy. We have
A (θ) = E0
·
e
−
³
r+ b
2
2
´
ηy,0d (Z)
¸
E0
·
e
bZ
η
y,0
d
¸
B (θ) = E0
·
e−
b2
2
ηy,0d (Z)
¸
E0
·
e
(b+σ)Z
η
y,0
d
(Z)
¸
and for all positive λ and positive α
E
h
e−λη
y,0
d
i
=
e−λd
R∞
d dt
ε exp
µ
− (ε+βt)
2
2t
¶
√
2πt3
1− e−ε
√
2λ
R d
0 dt
ε exp
³
−(λ+β
√
2λ)t− (ε+βt)
2
2t
´
√
2πt3
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E
·
e
αZ
η
y,0
d
¸
= e−αβd−
β2
2
d
R 0
−ε dv
R∞
v du
2(2u−v)√
2πd3
e−
(2u−v)2
2t
+(α+β)u
R∞
d dt
ε exp
³
− (ε+βt)
2
2t
´
√
2πt3
.
The optimal investment boundary is then obtained by maximizing the value
of the investment opportunity over h0 = he−σε and β.
Numerical simulations indicate that the abandonment option with ex-
ponential exercise barrier has a larger value than the Parisian abandonment
option. This is what was expected as we have now two degrees of freedom
h0 and β instead of one. This stresses that there exists a time dependence
of the optimal abandonment level to the time already spent in the approval
stage or to how long the firm has been consecutively gathering investors.
3 Concluding remarks
This paper provides a valuation framework for investment opportunities re-
lying on the computation of first passage times. We show that the delay
existing between the investment decision and its implementation has im-
portant valuation consequences. In particular, when the investing firm has
no profitability requirement once the investment decision has been made,
the value of the investment opportunity can be reduced by almost 10% for
a one year delay. We also show that European abandonment option do
not increase the value of the investment project. By contrast, the so-called
Parisian and exponential abandonment policies partly oﬀset the value loss
associated with the implementation lag.
Beyond the analysis of the eﬀects of the capital budgeting practices
within firms, typical applications of our model include the services oﬀered by
specialized investment funds or the cost of the recourse to outside financing.
For large projects it often takes considerable time to gather all the financing
funds as the decision process within the institutions involved in the project
can be highly time consuming. For example, the time necessary to gather
investors for a closed-end investment fund typically reaches one year during
which the economic and market conditions can completely change. The type
of financing funds may have an impact over the investment policy of firms
as they condition the availability of the option to abandon investment op-
portunities during the implementation delay. In the same way, the services
oﬀered by specialized investment funds constitute a typical application of
these options. Investment opportunities on emerging markets can take time
to be realized and an investment specialist can reduce the delay between the
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investment decision and its real implementation by providing a dedicated
vehicle. The best example in that case is an open-ended fund. The price to
pay for the immediacy of the opportunity is reflected in the bid-ask spread
for the fund as opposed to a closed-end investment in which case the monies
cannot be withdrawn.
Finally, one should mention that the approach presented in this paper
is general enough to allow us to extend the scope of our analysis to other
rigidities in the investment process. We focused in this paper on the de-
lay existing between the investment decision and its real implementation.
Other imperfections or rigidities can be considered such as noise existing in
the information available to the investor concerning the profitability of his
investment opportunity or the competition for corporate resources due to
the capital allocation process within firms.
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4 Appendix
4.1 The European abandonment option
Let us define ν−a,0d , the first instant when, d units of time after reaching 0, the
Brownian Motion is above −a. To be able to formally define ν−a,0d , we create
the series of random times T (i). T (0) = d. If the Brownian Motion is above
−a at that time, then ν−a,0d = T (0) = d. If not, we look at the first instant
after T (0) when the Brownian Motion reaches 0, that is TT
(0),0 = T ∗ (1).
Then, we write T (1) = T ∗ (1) + d, that is T (1) is d units of time after the
Brownian Motion has reached zero. If the Brownian Motion is above −a at
T (1), and if it was below −a in T (0) then ν−a,0d = T (1). Following the same
procedure one can generate the series of T (i). We have TT
(1),0 = T ∗ (2) and
T (2) = T ∗ (2) + d.
Now we definebT (0) = T (0)IB
T (0)
≥−abT (1) = T (1)IB
T (1)
≥−aI bT (0)=0 and generally
bT (i) = T (i)IB
T (i)
≥−a
iY
k=1
I bT (i−k)=0
Finally, we can write ν−a,0d =
P
i
bT (i). In this sum, the bT (i) are not inde-
pendent. Indeed P(bT (1) 6= 0, bT (2) 6= 0) = 0 because of the characteristic
function in the expression of bT (2), while P(bT (1) 6= 0) and P(bT (1) 6= 0) are
both strictly positive.
Proposition 2 For all positive λ and positive α, ν−a,0d and Bν−a,0d
are in-
dependent and
E
h
e−λν
−a,0
d
i
= e−λd
1−N
³
−a/
√
d
´
1−N
³
−
√
2λd− a/
√
d
´
E
·
e
αB
ν−a,0
d
¸
= ed
α2
2
1−N
³
α
√
d− a/
√
d
´
1−N
³
−a/
√
d
´ .
Proof. The proof of this Proposition is based on the Markov property of
Brownian Motion. Let us first focus on the Laplace transform of the law of
ν−a,0d . We have
E
h
e−λν
−a,0
d
i
= E
h
e−λ
P
i
bT (i)i
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Using the independence the Markov property we can write
E
h
e−λ
P
i
bT (i)i
= e−λd
∞X
i=1
E
h
IBd>−ae
−λd
i iY
k=1
E
h
IBd≤−ae
−λ(d+Td,0)
i
+ E
h
IBd>−ae
−λd
i
= e−λdE [IBd>−a]
Ã ∞X
i=1
³
E
h
IBd≤−ae
−λ(d+Td,0)
i´i
+ 1
!
= e−λd
E [IBd>−a]
1− E
h
IBd≤−ae
−λ(d+Td,0)
i .
Now, straightforward calculations give
E [IBd>−a] = 1−N
³
−a/
√
d
´
and
E
h
IBd≤−ae
−λ(d+Td,0)
i
= e−λdE
h
IBd≤−ae
−|Bd|
√
2λ
i
= N
³
−
√
2λd− a/
√
d
´
.
Thus, we obtain
E
h
e−λν
−a,0
d
i
= e−λd
1−N
³
−a/
√
d
´
1−N
³√
2λd− a/
√
d
´ .
Let us now focus on the position of the Brownian Motion. We can first
notice, using the Markov property, that the process is only conditioned by
the fact it was at the level 0 d units of time before ν−a,0d , and that it is higher
than −a. Therefore, we just have to compute
E
·
e
αB
ν
−a,0
d
¸
= E
£
eαBd
¯¯
Bd ≥ −a
¤
=
E
£
eαBdIBd≥−a
¤
P (Bd ≥ −a)
= ed
α2
2
1−N
³
α
√
d− a/
√
d
´
1−N
³
−a/
√
d
´
The result can be extended to a drifted Brownian Motion:
14
Proposition 3 For a positive ρ and for St = S0 exp
³³
µ− σ22
´
t+ σZt
´
where Z is a Brownian Motion, we have
Eh
·
e−ρν
h0,h
d (S)
¸
=
e−ρd
µ
1−N
µ
b
√
d+ ln
³
h0
h
´³
σ
√
d
´−1¶¶
1−N
µ
−
p
(2ρ+ b2)d+ ln
¡
h0
h
¢ ³
σ
√
d
´−1¶
Eh
·
Sγ
νh
0,h
d (S)
¸
= hγe
dγ
³
µ−σ
2
2
(1−γ)
´ 1−N
µ
(b+ γσ)
√
d+ ln
³
h0
h
´³
σ
√
d
´−1¶
1−N
µ
−b
√
d+ ln
¡
h0
h
¢³
σ
√
d
´−1¶ .
Proof. This result is obtained thanks to a simple application of Girsanov’s
theorem to Proposition 2 using the following Radon Nikodym derivative
∀t ≥ 0, dP
dL
¯¯¯¯
Ft
= exp
¡
bBt − b2t/2
¢
= Lt.
4.2 The Parisian abandonment option
4.2.1 Laplace transforms
Theorem 1 (Chesney Jeanblanc Yor 1995) If B is a Brownian mo-
tion starting from zero, then
∀λ ≥ 0, E [exp (−λτd (B))] =
1
Φ
³√
2λd
´
if Φ (x) =
R +∞
0 z exp
³
zx− z22
´
dz = 1 +
√
2πxe−
x2
2 N (x) .
Proof. We follow the lines of Chesney, Jeanblanc and Yor (1995) and start
with some definitions. The result could be proved by the use of excursion
theory and the description of Itô’s measure7, but the approach detailed here,
originally due to Chesney, Jeanblanc and Yor (1995), is less demanding.
Definition 1 We define the so-called slow filtration G = (σ (sgn (Bt)) ∨Fgt)t≥0.
It represents the information on the Brownian motion until its last zero
plus the knowledge of its sign after this. We intend to project a certain
martingale onto this new filtration.
7See for example Revuz and Yor (1991) exercise (4.10)
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Definition 2 We will call Azéma’s martingale the process¡
µt = sgn (Bt)
√
t− gt, t ≥ 0
¢
One can easily check that we have8 µt =
pπ
2E [Bt/Gt].
Definition 3 If we fix a real number t, the Brownian meander is the processµ
mu =
1√
t− gt
¯¯
Bgt+u(t−gt)
¯¯
, 1 ≥ u ≥ 0
¶
.
This meander is obviously independent from the variable sgn (Bt) and
both are independent from the σ-algebra Fgt . Following Chung (1976) we
give a few hints on how these results are derived.
First, let us see how the joint law (Bt, gt) is determined. Using the
so-called reflection principle of Désiré André, we can write
Px (Bt ∈ dy, T0 > t) =
1√
2πt
µ
e−
(x−y)2
2t − e−
(x+y)2
2t
¶
dy.
Now, if 0 < s < t, x > 0, y > 0,
P (gt ≤ s, |Bs| ∈ dx, |Bt| ∈ dy)
= P (|Bs| ∈ dx,∀u ∈ [s, t] , |Bu| 6= 0, |Bt| ∈ dy)
= P (|Bs| ∈ dx)P (∀u ∈ [s, t] , |Bu| 6= 0, |Bt| ∈ dy| |Bs| = x)
= P (|Bs| ∈ dx)Px (|Bt−s| , T0 > t− s) .
The last equality is obtained thanks to the Markov property. The explicit
form of this equation is known, and by integration with respect to x and
derivation with respect to s we get
P (gt ∈ ds, |Bt| ∈ dy) = dsdy I0<s<tIy>0ye
− y
2
2(t−s)
π
p
s (t− s)
.
Thanks to this last result, one gets:
P (m1 ∈ dz) = P
µ |Bt|√
t− gt
∈ dz
¶
= Iz∈R+z exp
µ
−z
2
2
¶
dz.
8A study of various properties of this martingale, along with other projections on the
slow filtration is performed in Azéma and Yor (1989).
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As for the independence of the meander with the Brownian Motion up
to its last zero, one method is to write the law of the meander as a limit in
finite distributions. That is to show that for 0 < u1 < .. < un < 1
P (mu1 ∈ dx1, ..,mun ∈ dxn)
does not depend on t and is independent of gt. Let us write it for m1. We
have
P (m1 ∈ dx, g1 ∈ ds) = P
µ |Bt|√
t− gt
∈ dx, g1 ∈ ds
¶
= P
µ |Bt|√
t− gt
∈ dx
¶
P (g1 ∈ ds)
We shall now turn to the proof the theorem. Let us define the following
exponential martingale:
Mλt = exp
µ
bBt −
b2t
2
¶
.
To prove the theorem, we choose to focus first on another stopping time:
τd (B) = inf {0 ≤ s : s− gs (B) = d,Bs ≥ 0} .
Now, following Azéma and Yor (1989), let us consider
³fMλt , t ≥ 0´ the pro-
jection of the F-martingale ¡Mλt , t ≥ 0¢ on G, defined by
fMλt = E hMλt ¯¯¯Gti
Then, we have fMλt = Φ (λµt) expµ−λ22 t
¶
To show this, notice that Bt = m1µt, with m1 and µt independent. Then,
let us write
fMλt = E·expµλBt − λ22 t
¶¯¯¯¯
Gt
¸
= exp
µ
−λ
2
2
t
¶
E [ exp (λm1µt)| Gt]
= exp
µ
−λ
2
2
t
¶Z
R+
exp (λzµt)P (m1 ∈ dz)
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the last equality coming from the fact µt is Gt-measurable. Writing that
expression explicitly gives
fMλt = expµ−λ22 t
¶Z
R+
exp (λzµt) z exp
µ
−z
2
2
¶
dz
= Φ (λµt) exp
µ
−λ
2
2
t
¶
It is useful to note that
³fMλt∧τd(B), t ≥ 0´ is a bounded martingale. In-
deed, it is positive and fMλt∧τd(B) ≤ Φ (λd). Now, we can apply the optional
stopping theorem to the martingale
³fMλt∧τd(B), t ≥ 0´, since τd (B) is almost
surely a finite stopping time of the filtration G:
E
hfMλt∧τd(B)i = 1
Thanks to Lebesgue’s theorem, we now let t go to infinity and obtain for
any λ ≥ 0
1 = E
hfMλτd(B)i
1 = E
·
Φ
³
λµτd(B)
´
exp
µ
−λ
2
2
τd (B)
¶¸
1
Φ
³
λ
√
d
´ = E ·expµ−λ2
2
τd (B)
¶¸
Therefore, we have ∀λ ≥ 0,
1
Φ
³
λ
√
d
´ = E ·expµ−λ2
2
τd (B)
¶¸
And then
E
£
exp
¡
−λτ−d (B)
¢¤
=
1
Φ
³√
2λd
´
The result can be extended to a drifted Brownian Motion:
Theorem 2 If Zt = Bt + bt, the Laplace transform of τd (Z) is given by
∀λ ≥ 0, E [exp (−λτd (Z))] =
Φ
³
b
√
d
´
Φ
³p
(2λ+ b2) d
´ .
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Proof. Using Girsanov’s theorem, we can write for λ ≥ 0
EP [exp (−λτd (Z))] = EL
·
exp (−λτd (Z))
dP
dL
¯¯¯¯
Fτd(Z)
¸
= EL
·
exp (−λτd (Z)) exp
µ
bBτd(Z) −
b2
2
τd (Z)
¶¸
= EP
·
exp
µ
−
µ
λ+
b2
2
¶
τd (B)
¶
exp
¡
bBτd(B)
¢¸
Moreover we know that τd and Bτd are independent, and in law, Bτd =
md =
√
dm1. Therefore
EP [exp (−λτd (Z))] = EP
·
e
³
−
³
λ+ b
2
2
´
τd(B)
´¸ Z +∞
0
ebx
x
d
exp
µ
−x
2
2d
¶
dx.
After some simplifications, we get for any λ ≥ 0
EP [exp (−λτd (Z))] =
1
Φ
³p
(2λ+ b2)d
´ Z +∞
0
ebx
x
d
exp
µ
−x
2
2d
¶
dx
=
Φ
³
b
√
d
´
Φ
³p
(2λ+ b2)d
´
Theorem 3 If Zt = Bt + bt, we have the following Laplace transform
∀λ ≥ 0, EP [exp (−λτad (Z))] = exp
³
ba− |a|
p
2λ+ b2
´ Φ³b√d´
Φ
³p
(2λ+ b2)d
´ .
Proof. We write that
τad (Z) = Ta (Z) + τd
¡
Z ◦ θTa(Z) − a
¢
where θ is the so-called ”shift operator” on the canonical space Ω. Using the
strong Markov property and the fact that the trajectories after and before
Ta are independent, we can write
EP [exp (−λτad (Z))] = EP
£
EP
£
exp (−λτad (Z))| FTa(Z)
¤¤
= EP
£
EP
£
exp
¡
−λ
¡
Ta (Z) + τd
¡
Z ◦ θTa(Z) − a
¢¢¢¯¯
Ta (Z)
¤¤
= EP [exp (−λTa (Z))]EP [exp (−λτd (Z))]
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4.2.2 Value of the investment opportunity
Under the Parisian investment policy, the value of the investment opportu-
nity is given by
V (h,∆, C, θ) = EQS0
h
e−rτ
h
d (S)
³
F
³
Sτhd(S)
,∞
´
−Ce
´i
where F (St,∞) is the expected present value of future profits accruing to
claimholders when the investment spending is realized at time t i.e.
F (St,∞) =
Z ∞
t
dse−ρ(s−t)ESt [f (Ss)]
Writing St = S0 exp
¡
σZbt
¢
where Zbt = Bt + bt and b =
¡
µ− σ2/2
¢
/σ, we
have
V (h,∆, C, θ) = EQS0
h
e−rτ
a
d(Zb)
³
F
³
S0 exp
³
σZb
τad(Zb)
´
,∞
´
−Ce
´i
with a = ln (h/S0) /σ. Thanks to the equality in law between τad
¡
Zb
¢
and
τ0d
¡
Zb
¢
+ T a
¡
Zb
¢
for two independent copies, we get
V (h,∆, C, θ) =
µ
S0
h
¶ξ
EQS0
h
e−rτ
0
d(Z
b)
i³
EQ
h
F
³
heσ
√
dm1 ,∞
´i
−Ce
´
where m1 is the Brownian meander taken at time 1. Finally, using theorem
2 and after simplifications, we obtain
V (h,∆, C, θ) =
µ
S0
h
¶ξ Φ³b√d´
Φ
³p
d (2ρ+ b2)
´

∆h
Φ
³
(σ + b)
√
d
´
Φ
³
b
√
d
´ −Ce

 .
4.3 The exponential abandonment barrier
We start by defining, for a given measurable negative function y, the follow-
ing stopping times
Ht,y = inf {s ≥ t : Bs = y (s− t)} .
We define the stopping time ηy,0d , the first instant when the Brownian motion
spends more than d units of time over y, the countdown starting when the
Brownian motion reaches y. As an approximation of the optimal policy, we
are interested in a particular y, of the form
y (t) = −ε− βt.
We have then the following result
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Proposition 4 For all positive λ and positive α, ηy,0d and Bηy,0d
are inde-
pendent and
EQ
h
e−λη
y,0
d
i
=
e−λd
R∞
d dt
ε exp
µ
− (ε+βt)
2
2t
¶
√
2πt3
1− e−ε
√
2λ
R d
0 dt
ε exp
³
−(λ+β
√
2λ)t− (ε+βt)
2
2t
´
√
2πt3
EQ
·
e
αB
η
y,0
d
¸
= e−αβd−
β2
2
d
R 0
−ε dv
R∞
v du
2(2u−v)√
2πd3
e−
(2u−v)2
2t
+(α+β)u
R∞
d dt
ε exp
³
− (ε+βt)
2
2t
´
√
2πt3
.
Proof. We shall first concentrate on the Laplace transform of the law of
ηy,0d . We can write directly
EQ
h
e−λη
y,0
d
i
=
∞X
i=0
µ
EQ
·
IH0,y≤de
−λ
³
H0,y+HH
0,y,0
´¸¶i
EQ
h
IH0,y>de−λd
i
=
EQ
£
IH0,y>de−λd
¤
1− EQ
h
IH0,y≤de−λ(H
0,y+HH
0,y,0)
i .
Now, we use the fact that for a Brownian motion B,
H0,y (B) = inf {t ≥ 0 : Bt + βt = −ε} = T−ε
³
Bβ
´
.
We also know that BH0,y = −ε − βH0,y. Furthermore, since the law of
HH
0,y,0 only depends on H0,y through the position of the Brownian motion
at that time, we get in law
HH
0,y,0 = T−ε−βH0,y .
These considerations allow us to write
EQ
·
IH0,y≤de
−λ
³
H0,y+HH
0,y,0
´¸
= e−ε
√
2λ
Z d
0
dt
ε exp
³
−
³
λ+ β
√
2λ
´
t− (ε+βt)
2
2t
´
√
2πt3
On the other hand, we get easily
EQ
h
IH0,y>de−λd
i
= e−λd
Z ∞
d
dt
ε exp
³
− (ε+βt)
2
2t
´
√
2πt3
.
This last results completes the computation.
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Let us now consider the position of the Brownian motion. The Markov
property of the process ensures that its position at the time ηy,0d is only
conditioned by the fact that d units of time before it was at the level 0, and
that it has not hit the barrier during this period. Therefore we just have to
compute
EQ
·
e
αB
η
y,0
d
¸
= EQ
h
eαBd
¯¯
T−ε
³
Bβ
´
≥ d
i
= e−αβd
EQ
h
eαB
β
d I
infu≤dB
β
u≥−ε
i
Q (T−ε (Bβ) ≥ d)
= e−αβd−
β2
2
d
R 0
−ε dv
R∞
v du
2(2u−v)√
2πd3
e−
(2u−v)2
2t
+(α+β)u
R∞
d dt
ε exp
³
− (ε+βt)
2
2t
´
√
2πt3
.
where the last equality uses the joint law between the Brownian motion and
its minimum.
We are now interested in similar results for the geometric Brownian
motion.
Proposition 5 For a positive r and for St = S0 exp
³³
µ− σ22
´
t+ σZt
´
where Z is a Brownian motion, and g (t) = he−σ(ε+βt) we have
EQh
h
e−rη
g,h
d (S)
i
= EQ
·
e
−
³
r+ b
2
2
´
ηy,0d (Z)
¸
EQ
·
e
bZ
η
y,0
d
¸
EQh
h
Sηg,hd (S)
i
= hEQ
h
exp
³
(b+ σ)Zηy,0d (Z)
´i
EQ
·
exp
µ
−b
2
2
ηy,0d (Z)
¶¸
Proof. This result is obtained by applying Girsanov’s theorem to proposi-
tion 4.
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